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We report the results of four empirical studies designed to investigate the extent 
to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk 
epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested that our shared 
epistemic practices may only include a source-relative closure principle—one that 
applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. We argue that the results 
of our studies provide reason for thinking that individuals are making a 
performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with the 
closure principle. When we used research materials that overcome what we think 
are difficulties with Turri’s original materials, we found that participants did not 
reject closure. Furthermore, when we presented Turri’s original materials to non-
philosophers with expertise in deductive reasoning (viz., professional 
mathematicians), they endorsed closure for both perceptual and inferential beliefs. 
Our results suggest that an unrestricted closure principle—one that applies to all 
beliefs, regardless of their source—provides a better model of folk patterns of 
knowledge attribution than a source-relative closure principle.  
                                                 
 * This paper has benefited greatly from helpful comments and suggestions from John Turri, Wesley 
Buckwalter, two anonymous reviewers from Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, an anonymous reviewer 
for the Second Annual Minds Online Conference, and audiences at the 2015 Experimental Philosophy Group UK 
conference, the 2016 Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology conference, and University College Dublin. 
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1. Introduction 
Epistemic closure principles have figured prominently in contemporary epistemology, 
particularly in discussions of radical skepticism. The most commonly discussed skeptical 
challenges in recent decades employ skeptical hypotheses that depict situations that are 
subjectively indistinguishable from what we take our normal circumstances to be but in which 
we fail to have knowledge. Where ‘p’ is some proposition we ordinarily take ourselves to know 
and ‘SK’ is a skeptical hypothesis, these challenges are typically represented as arguments of the 
following form
1
: 
(1.1) If I know that p, then I know that not-SK. 
(1.2) I do not know that not-SK. 
(1.3) Therefore, I do not know that p. 
Premise (1.2) is usually supported by considerations that purport to show that one’s current 
evidence somehow fails to favor p over SK. Premise (1.1) is usually taken to be an abbreviated 
substitution instance of the following closure principle for knowledge: 
EC1. If S knows that p, and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. 
Fred Dretske (1970) and Robert Nozick (1981) (in)famously denied that any closure principle for 
knowledge was true in their efforts to respond to radical skepticism and to construct a 
satisfactory theory of knowledge. However, it is well known that the tide of epistemological 
opinion has run strongly against Dretske and Nozick, with most philosophers agreeing that 
                                                 
 1 Cf. the presentations of skepticism in Brueckner (1985; 1994), DeRose (1999), Pritchard (2002a; 2002b; 
2005), and Greco (2008). 
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closure is “an extremely intuitive idea” (Hawthorne 2004, 33) and that it captures the seemingly 
incontrovertible idea that “deduction is a way of extending one’s knowledge” (Williamson 2000, 
117). Indeed, many would go further and agree with Richard Feldman’s (1995, 487) oft-quoted 
claim that the denial of closure was “one of the least plausible ideas to come down the 
philosophical pike in recent years.”  
 As John Turri (2015a, 3) notes, “closure’s proponents rely heavily on the claim that 
epistemic closure is a defining feature of ordinary thought and talk about knowledge—that is, of 
folk epistemology.” When philosophers claim a particular idea is extremely intuitive, it is 
common for experimental philosophers to wonder how many people actually agree with it and to 
look for ways to find out.
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 Accordingly, Turri (2015a) conducted a series of studies to investigate 
whether epistemic closure is in fact deeply embedded in folk epistemology. His results suggest 
that individuals may endorse closure only for perceptually based beliefs but not for inferential 
beliefs. 
 In a between-subjects design, Turri asked participants to read one of two versions of the 
following vignette: 
Car Theft. When Mr. Maxwell arrives at work in the morning, he always parks in one of 
two spots: C8 or D8. Half the time he parks in C8, and half the time he parks in D8. 
Today Maxwell parked in C8.  
It’s lunchtime at work. Maxwell and his assistant are up in the archives room searching 
for a particular document. Maxwell says, “I might have left the document in my car.” The 
                                                 
 2 Turri (2015, 3) writes, “This rather lavish gloss on ordinary practice and what ‘we’ find intuitively 
compelling or conversationally ‘abominable’ has thus far gone unchallenged, even by closure’s opponents (Nozick 
1981, 205-6; Dretske 2013, 32). Thus it is widely assumed that closure’s opponents bear the revisionist’s burden of 
either explaining away contrary intuitions or showing that their view delivers otherwise unattainable benefits.” 
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assistant asks, “Mr. Maxwell, is your car parked in space C8? It’s not unheard of for cars 
to be stolen.” 
The perception version of Car Theft ends with the following words: 
Maxwell looks carefully out the window and then responds, “No, my car has not been 
stolen. It is parked in C8.” 
The inference version ends with: 
Maxwell thinks carefully for a moment and then responds, “No, my car has not been 
stolen. It is parked in C8.” 
Car Theft is based upon Jonathan Vogel’s (1990) well known discussion of car theft type cases 
that did more than any other article at the time to convince epistemologists that the rejection of 
closure was a mistake. 
 Turri then asked participants to select all of the statements below that are true in the Car 
Theft vignette
3
: 
(2.1) Maxwell knows that his car is parked in C8.  
(2.2) Maxwell knows that his car has not been stolen. 
(2.3) Maxwell is in the archives room. 
(2.4) Maxwell is in his assistant’s office. 
Statements (2.3) and (2.4) served as comprehension checks. (2.1) and (2.2) tested for closure 
because Turri intended Maxwell to be depicted as (i) considering his belief that his car is parked 
in C8 and the basis upon which this belief rests, (ii) reaffirming his belief that the car is indeed 
parked there, (iii) appreciating that his car’s not being stolen follows from it’s being parked in 
                                                 
 3 In Turri’s first study, he presented participants with both (2.3) and (2.4) and either (2.1) or (2.2). In his 
second study, Turri presented each participant with all four statements. In a third study, he presented participants 
with conjunctions that combined (2.1) and (2.2), the negation of only one of these statements, or the negations of 
both. The overall pattern of data obtained in these different ways remained roughly the same. 
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C8, and (iv) affirming that it has not been stolen on this basis. If participants endorse closure, 
Turri thinks they should select (2.2) as often as they select (2.1). If, however, they reject closure, 
they should select (2.2) less often. 
 In Turri’s fifth study, he gave participants a second vignette that had the same structure as 
Car Theft: 
Computer. When Mrs. Palmer arrives at work in the morning, she always starts her 
computer and puts it to work analyzing data sets. Today she put her computer to work 
analyzing demographic data and then walked into her assistant’s office across the hall. 
Palmer says to her assistant, “It might take the computer a while to analyze the 
demographic data.” The assistant asks, “Mrs. Palmer, is your computer analyzing the 
data? It’s not unheard of for computer hackers to attack the system and crash a 
computer.” 
The perception and inference versions of Computer ended with one of the following statements: 
Mrs. Palmer looks carefully through the window into her office and then responds, “No, 
the hackers have not crashed it. The computer is analyzing data.” 
Mrs. Palmer thinks carefully for a moment about the matter and then responds, “No, the 
hackers have not crashed it. The computer is analyzing data.” 
Turri then asked participants to select all of the statements below that are true in the vignette: 
(3.1) Palmer knows that the computer is analyzing data. 
(3.2) Palmer knows that hackers have not crashed the computer. 
(3.3) Palmer is in the archives room. 
(3.4) Palmer is in her assistant’s office. 
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As above, (3.3) and (3.4) served as comprehension checks, while (3.1) and (3.2) tested for 
participants’ endorsement of epistemic closure for knowledge.  
 Turri found that participants thought Maxwell both knew that his car was parked in C8 
and knew that it had not been stolen in the perception condition. In the inference condition, 
participants thought that Maxwell knew that his car was parked in C8, but they were significantly 
less likely to think he knew that it had not been stolen. A similar pattern was found with 
Computer. Participants were as likely to think Palmer knew that her computer was analyzing 
data as they were to think that she knew that hackers had not crashed the computer in the 
perception condition. In the inference condition, however, they were less likely to think that she 
knew that the hackers had not crashed the computer than they were to think that she knew that 
the computer was analyzing data. Turri (2015a, 14) concludes: 
Overall, then, ordinary practice does not endorse an unqualified version of the epistemic 
closure principle. But it’s arguably consistent with our results that ordinary practice is 
committed to a source-relative version of the epistemic closure principle. In particular, 
it’s consistent with our results that a perceptual epistemic closure principle is a defining 
feature of folk epistemology. This is ironic given that the most famous attempted 
counterexamples feature perceptually based beliefs (e. g. Dretske’s zebra case). 
Turri’s findings thus seem to challenge the received view in contemporary epistemology that an 
unrestricted epistemic closure principle is a central and non-negotiable feature of our shared 
epistemic practices.  
 We agree with the received view that individuals’ are making a mistake when they 
endorse (2.1) and (3.1) but deny (2.2) and (3.2). However, we think the error lies not in denying 
that Maxwell knows that his car has not been stolen or that Palmer knows that hackers have not 
7 
crashed the computer when these beliefs are based upon inference. Rather, we think the error lies 
in agreeing that Maxwell knows that his car is parked in C8 or that Palmer knows that the 
computer is analyzing data in Turri’s inference conditions. We contend that the studies we report 
below provide support for our claim that participants in the inference conditions who agree with 
(2.1) and (3.1) are making a performance error. We use these data to argue that an unrestricted 
closure principle provides the best model of folk knowledge attributions. 
 There are a few other things about Turri’s method of examining closure that we think call 
for further investigation. One is that Turri believes that both the perception and inference 
versions of Car Theft and Computer depict the protagonists as believing one proposition, seeing 
that this proposition entails another, and (allegedly) believing the second on the basis of inferring 
it from the first. However, in the perception version of Car Theft, Maxwell “looks carefully out 
the window” and sees that his car parked in C8. Like Turri, most philosophers will probably 
think that he only sees that it is parked in C8 but does not see that it has been stolen. Thus, if he 
is to believe that his car has not been stolen, it will be necessary for him to draw an inference. 
However, the metaphysics and epistemology of perception are quite complex, and it is not clear 
to us that ordinary participants will think that an inference must be made in order for Maxwell to 
arrive at the belief that his car has not been stolen. In our view, it seems quite likely that many 
ordinary individuals will think that, in addition to seeing that his car is parked in C8, Maxwell 
will also see—directly and without the aid of inference (or at least without any inference in 
addition to those that may already be involved in perception)—that it has not been stolen. It 
seems quite intuitive to think that the fact that Maxwell is laying eyes on his car directly 
confirms his belief that his car has not been stolen and unintuitive to think that seeing his car can 
confirm his belief only if this sensory experience is coupled with the belief that seeing his car 
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entails that it has not been stolen. But if Turri’s participants understand Maxwell as seeing 
directly that his car has not been stolen, then the perception version of Car Theft will not test 
individuals’ endorsement of closure at all. Similar remarks apply to the Computer case, in which 
Palmer “looks carefully through the window into her office” and sees that the computer is 
analyzing the data and is perhaps also viewed as seeing that the computer has not crashed. 
Consequently, we may not be able to conclude (as Turri does) that ordinary individuals endorse 
closure for perceptually based beliefs but not for inferential ones. The lesson may simply be that 
when individuals are presented with clear tests for closure (e.g., in the inference conditions), they 
fail to endorse it. 
 The inference versions of Car Theft and Computer seem better poised to test for folk 
endorsement of closure because the protagonists in these cases are not in a position to directly 
perceive that the car has not been stolen or that the computer has not been crashed. These beliefs 
must be arrived at by inference. Of course, the protagonists are not in a position to directly verify 
that the car is parked in C8 or that the computer is analyzing the data either. But the important 
thing is that the beliefs about car theft and computer hacking can only be known on the basis of 
inference. 
 It is somewhat odd that Turri emphasizes the inferential component in Maxwell’s belief 
that his car is parked in C8 and Palmer’s belief that the computer is analyzing data without 
acknowledging that their beliefs are based upon perception and memory as well. Maxwell 
remembers where he parked his car when he arrived at work in the morning. Palmer remembers 
that when she arrived at work in the morning she started her computer and put it to work 
analyzing data sets. Furthermore, their memorial beliefs were ultimately based upon perception 
themselves. On the basis of what they remember, together with background beliefs about how 
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likely car thefts and hacker attacks are, each makes an inference about whether the car is still 
parked in C8 or the computer is still analyzing data. Since the ultimate basis of the beliefs in 
question are the protagonists’ (perceptually based) memories, it may be that participants reject 
closure in these cases because of the role of memory or background beliefs play in their 
justification rather than the role of inference. 
 A second issue with Turri’s studies that we think calls for more careful scrutiny is that in 
each condition he asked participants to select which of four statements—(2.1) through (2.4) or 
(3.1) through (3.4)—are true. We agree that if participants endorse closure, they should indicate 
that both (2.1) and (2.2) are true in the Car Theft case and (3.1) and (3.2) are true in Computer. 
However, the task demands imposed by Turri’s experimental set-up are such that participants 
might stop selecting true items not because they have fully thought through the relevant issue 
and determined that no more knowledge attributions should be made but rather that they have 
failed to reflect fully upon the issue. Consider the fact that someone might know that p is true 
and know that p entails q but not get around to forming the belief that q is true. In like fashion, 
participants might believe that Maxwell knows that his car is parked in C8 and that he knows 
that his car’s being parked entails that it has not been stolen. But a lack of sufficient motivation 
might keep them from thinking about, forming beliefs about, or bothering to select an answer 
about whether Maxwell knows that his car has not been stolen. Laziness seems far more likely to 
keep participants from attributing knowledge to Maxwell that he knows that his car has not been 
stolen than it does to keep them from attributing knowledge to him that his car is in C8. Turri, 
however, interprets failures to select (2.2) or (3.2) as true as meaning that participants do not 
endorse closure when the failure may have merely resulted from lack of motivation. We think 
that it would be more ideal if the tasks were structured so that each participant is required to 
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respond to statements (2.2) and (3.2) and is not given the option to simply skip facing them 
directly. 
 A third issue with Turri’s studies concerns the samples he used in his studies. Proponents 
of the ‘expertise defense’ (e.g., Sosa 2007, Williamson 2011) complain that when experimental 
philosophers use undergraduates, MTurk workers, or other adults who have not received formal 
philosophical training in their studies, the data they obtain are of rather poor quality and 
consequently fail to tell us anything interesting about how we should view the cases presented in 
the research materials. The complaint alleges that it is only the reflective intuitions of the 
suitably trained that would warrant the often surprisingly conclusions some experimental 
philosophers seek to support. In some concluding remarks, Turri (2015a, 15) considers the 
possibility that epistemic closure is “too subtle or complicated for ordinary people to understand, 
which is why they exhibit patterns that violate it,” but he notes that “ordinary people are 
remarkably sensitive to the complex factors that undermine knowledge in Gettier cases (Turri, 
Buckwalter, & Blouw 2014), which are at least as subtle and complicated as the epistemic 
closure principle.” 
 While we do not endorse the expertise defense as a general response to surprising results 
in experimental philosophy, we wondered whether non-philosophers who had more formal 
training in deductive reasoning than the average person might be better able to appreciate 
whatever complexities are involved in deductive closure. In particular, we wondered how 
professional mathematicians—who are like the folk in their general lack of familiarity with 
debates among philosophers concerning closure and skepticism but unlike the folk in regard to 
their expertise in deductive reasoning—might respond to Turri’s cases. If non-philosophers fail 
to indicate that Maxwell knows both that his car is parked in C8 and that his car has not been 
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stolen or fail to indicate that Palmer knows both that the computer is analyzing data and that it 
has not been crashed, it might be due to their lack of sufficient skill in handling entailment 
relations. In other words, their responses might reflect a performance error rather than the fact 
that closure is not an important part of folk epistemology. However, if professional 
mathematicians rejected closure at the same rates as other non-philosophers, we think we would 
be entitled to greater confidence in believing that this pattern of responses was evidence that an 
unrestricted closure principle is not in fact part of our core folk epistemic practices. 
 We performed a series of empirical studies designed to address each of the issues 
described above. We first replicated Turri’s basic results (Study 1) using Car Theft. In each of 
our studies, we required participants to respond to both the positive and the negative knowledge 
claims—i.e., to both (2.1) and (2.2) or both (3.1) and (3.2). We thereby addressed the second 
issue raised above concerning the possibility that a lack of sufficient motivation might interact 
with Turri’s experimental set-up in a way that kept participants from directly reflecting upon 
whether Maxwell knows that his car has not been stolen.  
 Above we noted that many participants might think that Maxwell can both see that his car 
is parked in C8 and see that it has not been stolen and thus that Car Theft may not really test for 
participants’ endorsement of closure at all. In order to provide participants with a perceptual case 
that involved inferring something from a perceptual belief that could not itself be directly 
verified by perception, in Study 2 we gave participants a modified version of Car Theft and 
asked them whether Maxwell knows that his car is parked in C8 and whether he knows that it has 
not been destroyed and replaced by an exact replica. We believe this study presents a more 
significant test of Turri’s source-relative closure hypothesis than his original Car Theft vignette 
because Maxwell is no longer able (if he ever was) to have direct perceptual access to the second 
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proposition in question. We found that participants in Study 2 overwhelmingly endorsed closure 
in both the perception and the inference conditions. Due to some concerns that Turri (2016) and 
Wesley Buckwalter (2016) raised about the fanciful nature of the vignette used in Study 2, we 
ran additional study (Study 3) to address these concerns and found further support for our case. 
 In our fourth study, we compared the knowledge attributions and denials of professional 
mathematicians with university undergraduates and, in accord with our hypothesis, found that 
mathematicians endorsed closure for both perceptual and inference beliefs. Also in accord with 
our expectations, they agreed with both positive and negative knowledge claims at much lower 
levels in the inference conditions than in the perception conditions. These findings support our 
contention that the non-philosophers in Turri’s studies are making a performance error when 
they attribute and deny knowledge in ways that conflict with the closure principle.  
 We maintain that an unrestricted closure principle that applies to all beliefs, regardless of 
source, provides a better model of the patterns of folk knowledge attributions that have been 
observed and thus that closure does seem to be a core part of folk epistemology after all. In the 
course of providing evidence for this conclusion, we also show that skeptical pressure from 
relevant alternatives that are difficult to rule out can significantly decrease knowledge 
attributions—an effect that experimental philosophers have not always been able to observe. 
 
2. Study 1 
In our first study, we attempted to replicate Turri’s (2015a) original results. We recruited 120 
participants (average age = 35, 34% female, 81% Caucasian, 100% native English speakers) 
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com) and presented them with either the 
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perception or the inference version of Car Theft.
4
 Turri’s first three studies used vignettes that 
ended with Maxwell stating “No, my car has not been stolen. It is parked in C8.” However, in his 
fourth study, in an effort to make clear to participants that Maxwell believed that his car had not 
been stolen because he believed it was parked in C8, Turri has Maxwell respond with “My car is 
parked in C8, so it has not been stolen.” We used the latter formulation in each of our studies.5 
 Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 
statements (2.1) and (2.2), the order of which was counterbalanced. Participants were asked to 
select one of the following seven options as their answer: Completely Disagree, Mostly 
Disagree, Slightly Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Slightly Agree, Mostly Agree, and 
Completely Agree. For purposes of analysis, ‘Completely Disagree’ was coded as ‘1,’ ‘Mostly 
Disagree’ as 2, and so on. Participant responses are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 Perception Inference 
Positive Knowledge 6.45*** (1.27) 6.20*** (1.22) 
Negative Knowledge 5.62*** (2.00) 3.75 (1.99) 
 
Table 1. Mean levels of agreement (and standard deviations) for each knowledge 
claim in the perception and inference conditions of Study 1. In all tables, an ‘*,’ 
‘**,’ or ‘***’ indicates that the designated mean differs significantly from the 
neutral midpoint at the .05, .01, or .001 level. 
 
                                                 
 4 Mturk workers in all studies were required to have at least a 98% approval rating on at least 5,000 tasks 
and were paid $.35 for their participation. Workers were prevented from participating in more than one study in this 
paper. 
 5  Turri’s use of this alternative formulation did not lead to a significant difference in participants’ 
responses, but we thought it was nonetheless preferable to use it in our own. In a fifth study that used Computer, 
Turri has Palmer state “No, the hackers have not crashed it. The computer is analyzing data.” In Study 5 below, 
where we use Computer, we changed this to “The computer is analyzing the data, so hackers have not crashed it.” 
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 Mean levels of agreement differed significantly from the neutral midpoint in three out of 
four cases (with very large effect sizes).
6
 A two-way mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect for source (perception vs. inference) that was medium in size and one for the valence 
(positive vs. negative) of the knowledge claim in question that was large in size.
7
 In other words, 
participants attributed knowledge in significantly greater numbers in the perception condition 
than in the inference condition and expressed more agreement with the positive knowledge claim 
than with the negative knowledge claim. A significant and medium-sized interaction was 
observed between source and valence.
8
 In other words, the lower agreement registered for the 
negative knowledge claim in the inference condition was the result of more than just the source 
and valence factors operating independently.
910
 
 In order to investigate possible differences in participants’ endorsement or rejection of 
closure, we grouped together all those who selected the ‘Completely Disagree,’ ‘Mostly 
Disagree,’ or ‘Slightly Disagree’ into a Disagree (or knowledge-denying) category, all who 
selected ‘Neither Agree Nor Disagree’ into a Neutral category, and all who selected ‘Slightly 
Agree,’ ‘Mostly Agree,’ or ‘Completely Agree’ into an Agree (or knowledge-affirming) 
category. We then classified participants as rejecting closure if they either (i) agreed (with some 
                                                 
 6 Perception/positive knowledge: t(59) = 14.97, p < .001, r = .89. Perception/negative knowledge: t(59) = 
6.26, p < .001, r = .63. Inference/positive knowledge: t(59) = 13.99, p < .001, r = .88. Inference/negative knowledge: 
t(59) = -.97, p > .05. 
 7 Source: F(1, 118) = 19.57, p < .001, r = .38. Valence: F(1, 118) = 77.38, p < .001, r = .63. 
 8 F(1, 118) = 18.76, p < .001, r = .37. 
 9 This result provides further confirmation Turri’s (2015b, 307) claim to have uncovered a new kind of 
cognitive bias, which he calls the ‘source-content bias,’ according to which “people evaluate inferential belief more 
harshly than perceptual belief,” “people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e., 
that something is not the case) than when it is positive (i.e., that something is the case),” and these two factors 
interact to produce a stronger effect in combination than would be predicted by the sum of their independent 
contributions. 
 10 There was no significant main effect for gender (F(1, 115) = .01, p > .05), and there were no significant 
interaction effects for gender (gender x source: F(1, 115) = 1.05, p > .05; gender x valence: F(1, 115) = .46, p > .05). 
Age was positively correlated with negative knowledge attributions in the perception condition (r = .34, p < .01). A 
three-way (source x valence x order) mixed ANOVA showed no main effect for order, F(1, 116) = .53, p > .05. 
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degree of confidence) with a positive knowledge claim but failed to agree with the negative 
knowledge claim (either by disagreeing with the latter or remaining neutral about it) or (ii) 
disagreed (with some degree of confidence) with a negative knowledge claim but failed to 
disagree with the positive knowledge claim (either by agreeing with it or remaining neutral). 
Participants were classified as endorsing closure if they did anything else. Participants’ responses 
are summarized in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Proportions of participants who rejected closure in the perception and 
inference conditions of Study 1. 
 
82% of participants in the perception condition attributed knowledge in accordance with the 
closure principle, while 53% of participants in the inference condition attributed knowledge in a 
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way that was inconsistent with the principle. These differences are statistically significant, with a 
medium effect size.
1112
 
 Study 1 thus replicates Turri’s initial finding that participants treat positive and negative 
knowledge claims very differently in the two conditions of Car Theft. Our results are also 
consistent with the hypothesis that closure applies to perceptually based beliefs but not to 
inferential beliefs. 
 
3. Study 2 
As we noted above, we harbored doubts about whether Car Theft was a good case to use to test 
for individuals’ endorsement of closure for perceptual beliefs. In the perception version of Car 
Theft, when Maxwell “looks carefully out the window” and sees that his car parked in C8, we 
think that many participants will think that Maxwell also sees—directly and without the aid of 
inference—that it has not been stolen. If this is how participants interpret the vignette, it will fail 
to serve as a test for closure.  
 Therefore, in Study 2, we constructed the following variant of Car Theft in which 
Maxwell comes to believe a proposition on the basis of perception, recognizes that this 
proposition entails a second proposition that he cannot directly verify by perception, and comes 
to believe this second proposition on the basis of the recognized entailment: 
Replica. Mr. Maxwell lives in a world where wizards like to practice their magical skills 
by destroying ordinary objects and replacing them with exact replicas. One problem with 
                                                 
 11 χ2 (1, N = 120) = 15.98, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .37. 
 12 There were no gender differences in participants’ rates of the endorsement or rejection of closure in 
either the perception or the inference conditions. Perception: χ2 (1, N = 60) = .89, p > .05. Inference: χ2 (1, N = 59) = 
.32, p > .05. There was a positive correlation between age and the endorsement of closure in the perception 
condition but not in the inference condition. Perception: r = .29, p < .05. Inference: r = .10, p > .05. 
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this is that while the wizards create exact replicas of the objects they destroy, they do not 
always create replicas of the internal contents of those objects. So, if they destroy your 
wallet and replace it with a replica, the replacement may not have copies of your money 
or credit cards in it. 
When Mr. Maxwell arrives at work in the morning, he parks his car in his usual parking 
spot, space C8. At lunchtime, Maxwell and his assistant are up in the archives room 
searching for a particular document. Maxwell says, “I might have left the document in 
my car.” The assistant asks, “Mr. Maxwell, is your car still parked in space C8? It’s not 
unheard of for wizards to destroy ordinary objects and replace them with exact replicas.” 
The perception and inference versions of Replica end with one of the following sentences: 
Maxwell looks carefully out the window and then responds, “My car is parked in C8, so 
it has not been destroyed and replaced with an exact replica.” 
Maxwell thinks carefully for a moment and then responds, “My car is parked in C8, so it 
has not been destroyed and replaced with an exact replica.” 
Like Car Theft, Replica features Maxwell wondering where a particular document is and 
thinking that he might have left it in his car. His assistant is again portrayed as raising a certain 
kind of error possibility—this time that it has been destroyed and replaced by an exact replica 
rather than that it has been stolen—after which Maxwell confidently affirms that he knows his 
car’s whereabouts. However, it is much less plausible to think that in the perception condition of 
Replica Maxwell can directly perceive that the error possibility in question does not obtain. We 
think this places the perception and inference conditions on a more equal footing in Replica than 
they are in Car Theft.  
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 After reading one of the versions of Replica, participants were asked the following 
comprehension question: 
Do the wizards always create replicas of the internal contents of the objects they destroy 
and recreate? 
Participants were directed to select either ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Those who failed to answer the question 
correctly had their responses to the positive and negative knowledge claims excluded from the 
statistical analysis. Participants were then asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with both (2.1) and the following claim, the order of which was counterbalanced:  
(2.5) Maxwell knows that his car has not been destroyed and replaced with an exact 
replica. 
Participants were given the same answer choices as in Study 1, and their responses were coded in 
the same fashion. 
 Using a between-subjects design, 120 participants (average age = 37, 45% female, 71% 
Caucasian, 95% native English speakers) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and 
were presented with either the perception or the inference condition of Replica. 11 participants 
failed to answer the comprehension question correctly. Responses from the remaining 
participants to the positive and negative knowledge claims are summarized in Table 2. 
 
 Perception Inference 
Positive Knowledge 4.28 (2.27) 4.58 (2.16) 
Negative Knowledge 4.08 (2.48) 4.50 (2.30) 
 
Table 2. Mean levels of agreement (and standard deviations) for each knowledge 
claim in the perception and inference conditions of Study 2. 
 
19 
 In sharp contrast to the results of Study 1 and Turri’s original studies, none of the mean 
levels of agreement differed significantly from the neutral midpoint
13
, and neither the source of 
belief nor the valence of the knowledge claim had any appreciable impact upon participants’ 
responses.
14
 In other words, on the whole participants were not inclined to think that Maxwell 
knows either that his car is parked in C8 or that it has not been destroyed and replaced with an 
exact replica. They were also not significantly inclined to deny these knowledge claims.
15
 
 As in Study 1, we grouped ‘Slightly Agree,’ ‘Mostly Agree,’ or ‘Completely Agree’ 
responses into a broad knowledge-affirming category and ‘Completely Disagree,’ ‘Mostly 
Disagree,’ or ‘Slightly Disagree’ into a knowledge-denying category, with ‘Neither Agree Nor 
Disagree’ responses falling into a Neutral category. When we looked at how often participants 
endorsed or rejected closure, we failed to observe the patterns that the source-relative closure 
hypothesis would lead us to expect (cf. Figure 2). 
 
                                                 
 13 Perception/positive knowledge: t(52) = .91, p > .05. Perception/negative knowledge: t(52) = .22, p > .05. 
Inference/positive knowledge: t(54) = 2.00, p = .051. Inference/negative knowledge: t(55) = 1.62, p > .05. 
 14 Source: F(1, 106) = 1.46, p > .05. Valence: F(1, 106) = .19, p > .05. Source x valence: F(1, 106) = .04, p 
> .05. 
 15 There were no gender effects. A three-way (source x valence x gender) mixed ANOVA showed no main 
effect for gender, F(1, 104) = 1.62, p > .05. A three-way (source x valence x order) mixed ANOVA showed no main 
effect for order, F(1, 104) = .72, p > .05. And age did not correlate with agreement to positive or negative 
knowledge claims in either the perception or inference conditions. Perception/positive knowledge: r = .15, p > .05. 
Perception/negative knowledge: r = -.06, p > .05. Inference/positive knowledge: r = -.04, p > .05. Inference/negative 
knowledge: r = .14, p > .05. 
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Figure 2. Proportions of participants who rejected closure in the perception and 
inference conditions of Study 2. 
 
Roughly three-fourths of participants in the perception condition and two-thirds in the inference 
condition attribute knowledge in ways that were consistent with closure. The differences 
between these distributions failed to be significant.
1617
 When we compared the perception data 
from Study 1 to the perception data from Study 2 and the inference data from Study 1 to the 
inference data from Study 2 using two chi squared tests of independence, we found that the 
frequency of closure denial in Study 2 was not significantly different than in Study 1 in the 
perception condition but was significantly lower in the inference condition, with a small effect 
size.
18
  
                                                 
 16 χ2 (1, N = 108) = .52, p > .05. 
 17 There were no gender differences in participants’ acceptance or rejection of closure and no correlations 
between age and closure. Gender/perception: χ2 (1, N = 53) = .68, p > .05. Gender/inference: χ2 (1, N = 55) = .08, p 
> .05. Age/perception: r = -.08, p > .05. Age/inference: r = .16, p > .05. 
 18 Perception: χ2 (1, N = 113) = 1.07, p > .05. Inference: χ2 (1, N = 115) = 4.96, p < .05, Cramér’s V = .21. 
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 It is crucial to note that the positive knowledge claim used in Study 2 is identical to the 
positive knowledge claims used in previous studies, and Maxwell’s evidence for this claim is 
identical as well. The only things that have changed are the relevant alternative that is 
incompatible with Maxwell knowing where his car is parked, Maxwell’s inability in the 
perception condition to have direct perceptual access to the falsity of this alternative, and how 
difficult it appears to be for Maxwell to rule out this alternative with his present evidence. 
Participants seemed to realize that Maxwell could not rule out the possibility of a wizarding 
deception and thus was not in a position to know that (2.5) was true. And in accordance with 
closure, they appeared to reason that Maxwell was therefore not in a position to know that (2.1) 
was true either. The source-relative closure hypothesis seems unable to explain why most of our 
participants attributed knowledge in accordance with the closure principle in both the perception 
and inference conditions in Study 2 and why the wizarding relevant alternative led them to 
attribute knowledge at lower rates than in previous studies.  
 As we argued above, we believe that the perception condition of Turri’s original Car 
Theft vignette does not serve as a good test case for closure-based knowledge. When Maxwell 
can look out the window and see that his car is parked in C8, participants may not think there is a 
need for him to infer that it has not been stolen. They may view him as being able to see this 
directly. We believe that Replica serves as a better test for the endorsement of closure for 
perceptual beliefs because Maxwell is unable to directly perceive whether or not the relevant 
alternative in question obtained.  
 However, in their comments on a previous draft of this paper presented at a recent 
conference, Turri (2016) and Buckwalter (2016) raise some concerns about Study 2. One of 
Buckwalter’s concerns is the following: 
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In any event, knowledge was not initially attributed in these cases, so an optimal test of 
closure cannot be performed. How can one evaluate what follows from a knowledge 
attribution in folk psychology if no attribution is present in the first place? 
Focusing on the fact that participants were not on the whole inclined to attribute positive 
knowledge in Replica, Buckwalter expresses doubts about Study 2’s ability to test whether 
participants’ think that knowledge is closed under known entailment. 
 However, we do not believe that the mean participant response to the positive knowledge 
claim is the right place to look to determine whether we have constructed an adequate test for 
closure. For one thing, individuals’ acceptance of a conditional should be tested in two different 
ways. One should look not only at whether those who endorsed the antecedent also endorsed the 
consequent. One should also look at whether those who rejected the consequent also rejected the 
antecedent. The data represented in Figure 2 take into account both of these possibilities. 
Furthermore, the data behind Figure 2 focus on the level of individual responses rather than on 
the broad level of group means. The analysis behind this figure looks at whether each individual 
who attributed positive knowledge also attributed negative knowledge and whether each 
individual who denied negative knowledge also denied positive knowledge. This analysis does 
not attempt to compute anything about closure denial on the basis of mean responses. On the 
basis of this individual-level analysis, we can see that three-fourths of participants in the 
perception condition and two-thirds in the inference condition attribute knowledge in ways that 
were consistent with closure. Thus, we do not think that Study 2 fails to provide an adequate test 
for closure for the reason in question. 
 Turri (2016) and Buckwalter (2016) both raise an additional concern that we think poses 
an interesting challenge to Study 2. Turri (2016) contends that “the wizardry scenario was 
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conspicuously extravagant and unrealistic,” suggesting that this might have “incited 
ambivalence, thereby masking the underlying effect.” Similarly, Buckwalter (2016) writes, 
“Stemming from the fanciful nature of the stimuli, there could be many reasons why attribution 
in magical worlds occurred at chance rates incidental to closure.” In an effort to examine the 
possible effects that the unrealistic Harry Potter-esque features of Replica might have had on 
participant responses in Study 2, we ran a follow-up study that was free of any non-Muggle 
elements. 
 
4. Study 3 
We have argued that the best way to test for the endorsement or denial of closure in cases of 
perceptually based belief is to have the agent in question form a belief in a proposition on the 
basis of perception, recognize that this proposition entails a second proposition, and yet be 
unable to tell directly by perception alone whether the second proposition is true. The Replica 
story satisfies this requirement, but Car Theft and Computer do not. For Study 3, we constructed 
two additional vignettes that satisfy this same requirement but lack the allegedly “extravagant” 
or “fanciful” characteristics of Replica.  
 The first story is based upon a case that has been widely discussed in the mainstream 
epistemological literature on Gettier cases and skepticism and that has been studied by some 
experimental philosophers (e.g., Nagel et al. 2013, Alexander et al. 2014): 
Table. James and Madeline are in a furniture store, shopping for a new table. James looks 
at a bright red table under normal lighting conditions and forms the belief that the table is 
red. After walking to the other side of the store and looking at several other pieces of 
furniture, James and Madeline begin talking about the red table again. Madeline says, “A 
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white table under red lighting conditions would look exactly the same to you, and you 
have not checked whether the lighting is normal, or whether there might be a red 
spotlight shining on the table.” 
The perception version of Table ends with the following: 
James walks back to the table, looks at it carefully, and then responds, “The table is red, 
so it is not a white table that has been illuminated to look red.” 
The inference version ends as follows: 
James does not walk back to the table, but he thinks carefully for a moment and then 
responds, “The table is red, so it is not a white table that has been illuminated to look 
red.” 
Participants in both conditions were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with the following two statements, the order of which was counterbalanced: 
(4.1) James knows that the table is red. 
(4.2) James knows that the table is not a white one that has been illuminated to look red. 
Participant responses were recorded on a seven-point in the same fashion as in previous studies. 
 The second vignette used in Study 3 was derived from one used by John Waterman, Chad 
Gonnerman, Karen Yan, and Joshua Alexander (forthcoming): 
Jaguar. Christine and Aleah go to the zoo. As they walk around, they pause in front of an 
exhibit marked “Brazilian Jaguar Enclosure.” Christine reads about jaguars from the sign, 
and looks out and sees a jaguar sleeping on the branch of a tree in the enclosure. After 
walking to the other side of the zoo and looking at several other exhibits, Christine and 
Aleah begin talking about the jaguar again. Aleah says, “African leopards look very 
much like Brazilian jaguars, and the signs in the zoo have recently been replaced by an 
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inexperienced crew of workers. If a worker had accidentally switched the signs on their 
exhibits, you wouldn’t be able to tell the difference between a jaguar and a leopard.” 
The perception and inference versions end with one the following two sentences: 
Christine walks back to the jaguar exhibit, looks carefully at the animal sleeping in the 
tree, and then responds, “The animal is a jaguar, so it is not a leopard.” 
Christine does not walk back to the jaguar exhibit, but she thinks carefully for a moment 
and then responds, “The animal is a jaguar, so it is not a leopard.” 
Participants in both conditions were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with the following statements, the order of which was counterbalanced: 
(5.1) Christine knows that the animal in the pen is a jaguar. 
(5.2) Christine knows that the animal in the pen is not a leopard. 
 100 workers (average age = 37, 47% female, 75% Caucasian, 97% native English 
speakers) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were presented with either the perception version of 
Table and the inference version of Jaguar or the inference version of Table and the perception 
version of Jaguar. The order of presentation of the vignettes was counterbalanced. Participant 
responses to Table and Jaguar are summarized in Table 3. 
 
 Table Jaguar 
 Perception Inference Perception Inference 
Positive Knowledge 5.54*** (1.63) 5.10*** (1.84) 4.62* (1.73) 4.39 (1.99) 
Negative Knowledge 5.14*** (1.89) 5.02*** (1.88) 4.36 (1.79) 3.94 (1.96) 
 
Table 3. Mean levels of agreement (and standard deviations) for each knowledge 
claim in the perception and inference conditions of Study 3. 
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 Mean levels of agreement with (4.1) and (4.2) fell significantly above the neutral 
midpoint in all cases, with large effect sizes.
19
 With only one exception, mean levels of 
agreement with (5.1) and (5.2) did not differ significantly from the midpoint.
20
 A three-way 
(vignette x source x valence) mixed ANOVA revealed a small main effect for vignette.
21
 In other 
words, the difference between the typical level of agreement with knowledge attributions in 
response to Table and the typical level of agreement with knowledge attributions in Jaguar was 
significant.  
 Importantly, and in contrast to Turri’s studies and Study 1 (but not Study 2), the source of 
the agents’ beliefs in Table and Jaguar made no difference to participants’ level of agreement 
with the four knowledge attributing statements.
22
 In other words, participants were neither more 
nor less inclined to attribute knowledge in Table and Jaguar when the belief was perceptually 
based than when it was inferential. There was also no interaction between vignette and source.
23
 
 There was a small, significant main effect for valence.
24
 In other words, participants were 
somewhat more inclined to agree with positive knowledge claims than negative knowledge 
claims. There were no significant interactions between valence and vignette, valence and source, 
or valence, vignette, and source.
2526
 
                                                 
 19  Table/perception/positive knowledge: t(49) = 6.68, p < .001, r = .69. Table/perception/negative 
knowledge: t(49) = 4.28, p < .001, r = .52. Table/inference/positive knowledge: t(49) = 4.22, p < .001, r = .52. 
Table/inference/negative knowledge: t(49) = 3.84, p < .001, r = .48.  
 20  Jaguar/perception/positive knowledge: t(49) = 2.54, p < .05, r = .34. Jaguar/perception/negative 
knowledge: t(49) = 1.42, p > .05. Jaguar/inference/positive knowledge: t(48) = 1.37, p > .05. 
Jaguar/inference/negative knowledge: t(49) = -.22, p > .05. 
 21 F(1, 195) = 12.39, p < .01, r = .24. 
 22 F(1, 195) = 1.46, p > .05. 
 23 F(1, 195) = .01, p > .05. 
 24 F(1, 195) = 11.45, p < .01, r = .24. 
 25 Valence x vignette: F(1, 195) = .37, p > .05. Valence x source: F(1, 195) = .19, p > .05. Valence x 
vignette x source: F(1, 195) = 2.00, p > .05. 
 26 There was no significant main effect for gender, and there were no significant interaction effects for 
gender. Main effect: F(1, 195) = 2.29, p > .05. Gender x vignette: F(1, 195) = 1.35, p > .05. Gender x source: F(1, 
195) = .00, p > .05. Gender x valence: F(1, 195) = .00, p > .05. Age did not correlate with either positive or negative 
 
27 
 In regard to the endorsement or denial of closure, the results of Study 3 are quite striking 
(cf. Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Proportions of participants who rejected closure in the perception and 
inference conditions of Table and Jaguar in Study 3. 
 
Participants overwhelmingly attributed or denied knowledge in accordance with the closure 
principle for knowledge in both the perception and the inference conditions of Table and Jaguar. 
Furthermore, the degree to which their knowledge judgments accorded with closure was higher 
than in previous studies. A chi squared test of independence that combines data from Table and 
                                                                                                                                                             
knowledge claims in either the perception or the inference conditions. There was, however, a significant order 
effect, with participants being (surprisingly) slightly more likely to agree with both knowledge claims when the 
negative knowledge claim was presented first. Four-way (vignette x source x valence x order) mixed ANOVA: F(1, 
191) = 9.79, p < .01, r = .22. 
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Jaguar reveals no significant difference between rates of closure denial in the perception and 
inference conditions.
27
 
 Recall that Turri (2016) and Buckwalter (2016) were concerned that the magical features 
of Replica might render it unsuitable as a tool to test for ordinary epistemic judgments. However, 
when we constructed cases with the same overall structure as Replica but without these magical 
elements, our results did not change. Turri and Buckwalter also expressed doubts about what 
could be concluded from our Replica data because participants were not significantly inclined to 
agree with the positive knowledge claim in question. However, participants who were presented 
with Table were strongly inclined to agree with the positive knowledge claim in both the 
perception and the inference conditions. This means that our Table data are the sort of data that 
Turri and Buckwalter think should be used to test for closure. Yet we did not find that 
participants’ knowledge attributions and denials conflicted with closure. 
 For reasons described above, we contend that Car Theft and Computer do not represent 
good tests of closure for perceptual beliefs. When we constructed three vignettes that are capable 
of serving as better tests for closure in these conditions, we found that participants do not deny 
closure for perceptual beliefs. This result, of course, is one that Turri (2015a) already claims to 
have established. Nonetheless, we think that the result is on a stronger footing now that better 
tools have been used to study it.  
 Significantly, we failed to find the same kind of violations of closure for inferential 
beliefs that Turri obtained and that we observed in Study 1 using Turri’s materials. The source-
relative closure hypothesis suggested but not fully endorsed by Turri (2015a) should not be 
misinterpreted as the thesis that individuals never attribute or deny knowledge in ways that are 
                                                 
 27 χ2 (1, N = 199) = .85, p > .05. 
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consistent with the closure principle. Because the closure principle is supposed to apply to all 
pairs of propositions, the rejection of closure simply means that it does not always hold. 
Nevertheless, an important question is why individuals would deny closure in the inference 
conditions of Car Theft and Computer. A limitation of Studies 2 and 3 is that they cannot directly 
speak to this question. Therefore, we designed an additional study that explored the possibility 
that participants might be making a performance error when they deny closure. 
 
5. Study 4 
In Section 1, we noted that Turri (2015a, 15) considers the possibility that epistemic closure is 
“too subtle or complicated for ordinary people to understand, which is why they exhibit patterns 
that violate it.” Although Turri does not think this possibility underlies the actual pattern of 
results he obtained, we suggested that non-philosophers might failed to attribute knowledge in 
accordance with the closure principle either because they reject closure or because they lacked 
sufficient skill in handling whatever subtlety or complexity is involved in reasoning in 
accordance with the closure principle. We hypothesized that if closure were a central feature of 
folk epistemology, non-philosophers who had formal training in deductive reasoning would thus 
attribute knowledge in ways that were more consistent with the closure principle than the 
average undergraduate or MTurk worker who lacked the relevant training.  
 Consequently, for Study 4, we recruited two groups of participants. One group was 
composed of 254 undergraduates from a large public institution in the northeastern United States 
(average age = 20, 63% female, 61% Caucasian, 81% native English speakers). The second set 
of participants consisted of 208 professional mathematicians from large and regional public 
institutions across the United States (average age = 48, 14% female, 73% Caucasian, 73% native 
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English speakers). The mathematicians were recruited via personal email invitation. Their emails 
were obtained from the webpages of their respective departments.
28
 In addition to being trained 
in formal methods of reasoning, we also presumed these mathematicians would be more 
intelligent than the average person and thus would commit fewer performance errors in their 
application of their concept of knowledge than ordinary participants. 
 Each participant in Study 4 was given two vignettes to read and evaluate. Participants 
received either the perception version of Car Theft and the inference version of Computer or the 
inference version of Car Theft and the perception version of Computer. The order with which 
participants responded to these vignettes was counterbalanced. Each participant who received a 
Car Theft vignette was then asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 
(2.1) and (2.2), and each participant who received some version of Computer was asked whether 
they agreed or disagreed with (3.2) and (3.3). The order of these statements was also 
counterbalanced. Participant responses were recorded in the same fashion as in the studies above 
and are summarized in Table 4. 
 
  Car Theft 
(Perception) 
Car Theft 
(Inference) 
Computer 
(Perception) 
Computer 
(Inference) 
Undergraduates 
Positive 
Knowledge 
 
6.16*** (1.32) 
 
5.70*** (1.83) 
 
5.74*** (1.42) 
 
5.26*** (1.86) 
Negative 
Knowledge 
 
5.19*** (1.89) 
 
3.52* (2.12) 
 
4.90*** (1.93) 
 
3.92 (1.99) 
Mathematicians 
Positive 
Knowledge 
 
6.14*** (1.34) 
 
4.13 (2.47) 
 
5.14*** (2.02) 
 
3.69 (2.37) 
Negative 
Knowledge 
 
5.44*** (1.89) 
 
2.46*** (1.97) 
 
4.65** (2.14) 
 
2.93*** (2.09) 
 
Table 4. Mean levels of agreement (and standard deviations) for each participant 
group and each knowledge claim in the perception and inference conditions of 
Study 4. 
                                                 
 28  58% of the mathematicians claimed some area of discrete mathematics as their primary area of 
specialization, with 14% in analysis and 18% in applied mathematics. 
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 The mean levels of agreement differed from the neutral midpoint in thirteen of the sixteen 
cases.
29
 Ten of these thirteen were above the midpoint, and three were below. A four-way mixed 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for each of the following independent variables: 
group (undergraduates vs. mathematicians), vignette (Car Theft vs. Computer), source 
(perception vs. inference), and valence (positive vs. negative).
30
 In other words, (i) there were 
significant differences in how undergraduates and mathematicians responded to the research 
materials (with mathematicians reporting lower levels of agreement with all knowledge claims), 
(ii) participants were less inclined to attribute knowledge in Computer than in Car Theft, (iii) 
participants attributed knowledge less often in the inference conditions than in the perception 
conditions, and (iv) participants expressed lower levels of agreement with negative knowledge 
claims than with positive knowledge claims. 
 The following two-way interactions were also significant: group x source, group x 
valence, vignette x source, vignette x valence, and valence x source.
31
 In other words, the two 
                                                 
 29  Undergraduates/Car Theft/perception/positive knowledge: t(127) = 18.54, p < .001, r = .85 
Undergraduates/Car Theft/perception/negative knowledge: t(95) = 7.45, p < .001, r = .61. Undergraduates/Car 
Theft/inference/positive knowledge: t(125) = 10.42, p < .001, r = .68. Undergraduates/Car Theft/inference/negative 
knowledge: t(125) = -2.53, p < .05, r = .22. Undergraduates/Computer/perception/positive knowledge: t(125) = 
13.73, p < .001, r = .78. Undergraduates/Computer/perception/negative knowledge: t(124) = 5.19, p < .001, r = .42. 
Undergraduates/Computer/inference/positive knowledge: t(127) = 7.66, p < .001, r = .56. 
Undergraduates/Computer/inference/negative knowledge: t(127) = -.45, p > .05. Mathematicians/Car 
Theft/perception/positive knowledge: t(96) = 15.78, p < .001, r = .85. Mathematicians/Car Theft/perception/negative 
knowledge: t(95) = 7.45, p < .001, r = .61. Mathematicians/Car Theft/inference/positive knowledge: t(109) = .54, p 
> .05. Mathematicians/Car Theft/inference/negative knowledge: t(109) = -8.20, p < .001, r = .62. 
Mathematicians/Computer/perception/positive knowledge: t(110) = 5.96, p < .001, r = .49. 
Mathematicians/Computer/perception/negative knowledge: t(110) = 3.20, p < .01, r = .29. 
Mathematicians/Computer/inference/positive knowledge: t(96) = -1.29, p > .05. 
Mathematicians/Computer/inference/negative knowledge: t(95) = -5.02, p < .001, r = .46. 
 30 Group: F(1, 912) = 44.66, p < .001, r = .22. Vignette: F(1, 912) = 8.31, p < .01, r = .10. Source: F(1, 
912) = 180.97, p < .001, r = .41. Valence: F(1, 912) = 280.34, p < .001, r = .48. 
 31 Group x source: F(1, 912) = 27.40, p < .001, r = .17. Group x valence: F(1, 912) = 10.70, p < .01, r = .11. 
Vignette x source: F(1, 912) = 7.79, p < .01, r = .09. Vignette x valence: F(1, 912) = 15.26, p < .001, r = .13. 
Valence x source: F(1, 912) = 29.25, p < .001, r = .18. There was also a significant three-way interaction between 
vignette, source, and valence: F(1, 912) = 7.27, p < .01, r = .09. 
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groups of participants responded differently to information regarding the source of the 
protagonist’s belief and to the valence of each knowledge claim. Furthermore, how participants 
were affected by the valence of the knowledge claims determined in part by which vignette they 
read and the source of the protagonist’s belief.32 
 The most important finding at this stage of analysis concerns the very different ways that 
undergraduates and mathematicians responded in the two inference conditions. In the inference 
versions of Car Theft and Computer, undergraduates strongly agreed with the positive 
knowledge claims that Maxwell knows that his car is parked in C8 and that Palmer knows that 
the computer is analyzing data. By contrast, mathematicians’ responses to these knowledge 
claims did not differ from chance. In response to the negative knowledge claims that Maxwell 
knows his car has not been stolen and that Palmer knows that hackers have not crashed the 
computer, undergraduates’ responses did not differ from chance, while the responses of 
mathematicians fell significantly below chance. In short, mathematicians were much more 
skeptical about the protagonist’s ability to obtain knowledge of the propositions in question 
simply by thinking carefully about the matter for a moment. We think this is the correct 
perspective to take on the inference-based knowledge claims, given the lower reliability of 
thinking carefully for a moment, as compared to looking carefully out the window directly at the 
objects in question.  
                                                 
 32 Analyzing our two participant groups separately, among the mathematicians there was no main effect for 
gender and no significant interaction between gender and source, but there was a small but significant interaction 
between gender and valence. Gender: F(1, 403) = .72, p > .05. Gender x source: F(1, 403) = .07, p > .05. Gender x 
valence: F(1, 403) = 4.58, p < .05, r = .11. For undergraduates, there was no significant main effect for gender 
(although it approached significance) and no interaction effect between gender and source, but there was again a 
significant interaction between gender and valence. Gender: F(1, 503) = 3.81, p = .052, r = .09. Gender x source: 
F(1, 503) = .08, p > .05. Gender x valence: F(1, 503) = 11.21, p < .01, r = .15. Both significant interaction effects 
manifested themselves with females indicating levels of agreement with positive and negative knowledge claims 
that were further apart than the levels of agreement males indicated for positive and negative knowledge claims. 
There were no significant correlation between age and either positive or negative knowledge ratings among either 
group of participants in either the perception or the inference conditions. 
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 Nevertheless, mathematicians continued to indicate greater levels of agreement with 
positive knowledge claims than with negative knowledge claims (cf. Figures 4 and 5, which 
combine data from the Car Theft and Computer vignettes). As predicted, however, the difference 
between the mean levels of agreement expressed toward positive and negative knowledge claims 
was smaller for mathematicians than for undergraduates. In the perception conditions, the 
difference between undergraduates’ mean level of agreement with positive and negative 
knowledge claims was 1.0, whereas for mathematicians it was 0.6. In the inference conditions, 
the difference between undergraduates’ ratings of positive and negative knowledge claims was 
1.8, while for mathematicians it was 1.2.
33
 
 
 
                                                 
 33 Our findings provide a modest degree of support for Turri’s (2015b) source-content bias hypothesis, 
inasmuch as there was a significant interaction between source and valence in the mathematicians’ responses to the 
positive and negative knowledge claims (F(1, 411) = 10.22, p < .01, r = .16.). Although the effect size was smaller 
than for other participant groups, the fact remains that mathematicians indicated lower levels of agreement with 
negative inferential beliefs, as compared to other kinds of beliefs.  
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Figure 4. Mean levels of agreement with positive and negative knowledge claims 
by undergraduates and mathematicians in the perception conditions of Study 4. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals in all figures. 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean levels of agreement with positive and negative knowledge claims 
by undergraduates and mathematicians in the inference conditions of Study 4. 
 
 Combining data from both the Car Theft and the Computer vignettes and assessing 
participants’ endorsement or rejection of closure leads to the results depicted in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Proportions of undergraduates and mathematicians who rejected closure 
in the perception conditions of Study 4. 
 
 Mathematicians were much less likely to reject closure in either the perception or 
inference conditions. Two chi squared tests of independence conducted separately on the 
perception and inference data revealed that the differences between undergraduates and 
mathematicians in both conditions were significant.
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 Mathematicians did reject closure at 
slightly higher rates in the inference conditions than in the perception conditions, but note that 
mathematicians’ rejection of closure in the inference conditions was roughly equivalent to 
undergraduates’ rejection of closure in the perception conditions of this and other studies. On the 
                                                 
 34 Perception: χ2 (1, N = 460) = 5.60, p < .05, Cramér’s V = .11. Inference: χ2 (1, N = 460) = 10.95, p < .01, 
Cramér’s V = .15. 
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whole, then, mathematicians strongly endorsed closure for both perceptual and inferential 
beliefs.
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 According to the source-relative closure hypothesis articulated by Turri (2015a), our 
shared epistemic practices include a closure principle that applies to perceptually based beliefs 
but not to inferential beliefs. The mathematicians that participated in Study 4 are folk-like in that 
they are not actively involved in philosophical debates about closure and related matters such as 
skepticism, but they are unlike ordinary folk in regard to their expertise in deductive reasoning. 
If the source-relative closure hypothesis were true, there should not be any reason why their 
formal training should lead them to depart from the folk epistemological dictum that closure only 
applies to perceptually based beliefs. Our findings do not accord with this prediction. In fact, 
they provide significant support for the claim that an unrestricted closure principle figures 
importantly in folk epistemology. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The three most important features of the studies we report in this contribution are the following. 
First, we constructed three vignettes in Studies 2 and 3 that provide better tests for the folk 
endorsement of closure for perceptual beliefs than Turri’s (2015a) original Car Theft and 
Computer vignettes. We found that individuals’ knowledge attributions in the perception 
conditions of these studies strongly conform to closure. Because of concerns we had about the 
way Turri designed his perception conditions, we had doubts about whether his studies showed 
                                                 
 35 There were no significant correlations between age and endorsement of closure among undergraduates or 
mathematicians. Undergraduates: r = .06, p > .05. Mathematicians: r = -.05, p > .05. Among undergraduate 
participants, males were significantly more likely to endorse closure in the inference conditions than females, but 
there were no significant differences in the perception conditions. Perception: r = .09, p > .05. Inference: r = .16, p < 
.05. Among mathematicians, there were no significant correlations between gender and closure, although the 
correlation in the inference conditions approached significance. Perception: r = .04, p > .05. Inference: r = .13, p= 
.07. 
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that individuals endorsed closure for perceptual beliefs. We believe that the conclusion that they 
do so is now on a stronger footing in light of these new studies. We would also like to echo 
Turri’s (2015a, 14) claim that “[t]his is ironic given that the most famous attempted 
counterexamples [to closure] feature perceptually based beliefs (e.g. Dretske’s zebra case).” 
 Secondly, in the inference conditions of Studies 2 and 3 our participants endorsed closure 
for beliefs that we thought would be strongly analogous to the inferential beliefs in Car Theft and 
Computer, where Turri (2015a) and we observed violations of closure. The perception conditions 
of Replica, Table, and Jaguar were supposed to represent improvements over earlier materials, 
but we did not intend the inference conditions to be significantly different. The only factor that 
we think might be responsible for this difference is the fact that the relevant alternatives in 
Replica, Table, and Jaguar (viz., Maxwell’s car being destroyed and replaced with an exact 
replica by wizards, a white table being illuminated to look red, and a leopard looking like a 
jaguar to Christine) seem to be more difficult for the agents in question to rule out on the basis of 
the evidence available to them than the ones in Car Theft and Computer (viz., a car being stolen, 
hackers crashing a computer). We hypothesis that relevant alternatives that are more difficult to 
rule out make an agent’s epistemic shortcomings or inabilities more salient than alternatives that 
are less difficult to rule out. This increased salience then leads participants to decrease 
knowledge attributions all around. However, it should be admitted that this hypothesis requires 
further investigation before we can place much confidence in it. 
 Thirdly, we found that the knowledge attributions and denials of non-philosophers who 
are folk-like with respect to debates about closure and skepticism but who are experts in 
deductive reasoning strongly adhered to the closure principle for knowledge. The 
mathematicians in Study 4 endorsed closure for inferential beliefs at rates similar to those 
38 
observed with MTurk workers and undergraduate populations for perceptual beliefs. We believe 
that the epistemic behavior of these model folk provide reason for thinking that other individuals 
are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with the 
closure principle. We conclude that the best explanation of these findings is that an epistemic 
closure principle for knowledge appears to be a central feature of folk epistemology after all. 
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